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Collapse of the French Protectorate 
Theoretical and Historical Frameworks 
During the twentieth century, Western political scientists postulated that a state reaching 
modernity would be formidable combatant against the spread of international communism. As 
Walt Whitman Rostow, National Security Advisor during the Johnson administration and an 
ardent supporter of the modernization theory, noted, when societies reach maturity, citizens 
become “aware and anxious to acquire the consumption fruits of a mature economy.”  Rostow 
argued that, since Marxist theory focused on supply rather than demand, consumerism would 
likely cause Communism “to wither in the age of high mass-consumption.”1 In the early 1950s, 
the United States attempted to solidify a political and economic alignment with Cambodia that 
would not only prevent communist encroachment, but would also help build a state strong 
enough to repel communism on its own. However, the economic and military aid provided by the 
United States to help Cambodia build a modern state propelled Cambodia toward communism 
rather than away from it. Although there are many mitigating social, political, and regional 
dimensions that participated in giving rise to the Khmer Rouge, this paper will focus on how the 
United States hindered Cambodia’s path to modernity and, in doing so, made Cambodia 
vulnerable to communist infiltration. 
Following the Lisbon Conference in 1952, the United States increased its economic and 
military aid to the French mission in Indochina from $300 million to $800 million, which was to 
be used to help France with the “reconstruction and expansion” of their domestic economy and 
the economy of their overseas territories. Granting such a substantial amount of assistance 
hinged on France’s promise to begin to recognize the “importance of adopting and pursuing 
economic and financial policies designed to lead [the Indochinese states] to eventual 
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independence of aid.” 2  Along with indirect economic aid to Indochina, the United States also 
began pursuing direct economic ties to Indochina without French involvement. By 1953, the 
United States had conducted roughly $25 million worth of direct trade with Indochina with the 
intent of accustoming Indochina to the purchase and use of American products.
3
 This was, of 
course, much to the dismay of French officials who were still adjusting to the loss of exclusive 
trading rights within their colonies. This pre-independence trade between the United States and 
Cambodia served as the seedlings of the further economic partnership that would arise as 
Cambodia solidified its independence. 
King Norodom Sihanouk took political control of Cambodia on November 9, 1953 
following Cambodia’s independence from the French Protectorate. The National Bank of 
Cambodia (NBC) was established in December of 1954, and the riel took the place of the 
Indochinese piaster as the official currency of Cambodia. King Sihanouk, under the guise of the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum movement, attempted to implement a mixed-economy enterprise, which 
put individual capital under the guidance of the state to safeguard against “‘privileged capitalists, 
national or foreign.’”4 However, along with nationalizing various business sectors, Sihanouk had 
to rely on foreign investors and investments to help industrialize Cambodia. No longer under the 
protection of the Protectorate, foreign assistance was needed to purchase machinery, raw 
materials, and building materials for basic modes of industrial production as Cambodia had little 
own-source revenue. Even with the industries that remained intact following independence, 
Cambodia had to rely on foreign industrial workers as there were few domestic technicians that 
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knew how to operate industrial equipment and machinery.
5
 In the 1950s, the United States 
trained 184 Cambodians in the United States and other countries in government and agricultural 
practices. Over 400 Cambodians also received on-site training through Cambodian-American 
agricultural assistance programs.
6
 Despite such United States technical support, it was 
counterintuitive for the Sangkum’s ultimate goal of freeing Cambodia from capitalist influences. 
Such programs, as much as they were needed, only solidified the U.S.-Cambodian economic ties 
and produced tighter, yet unequal, trade relations. 
According to Phlek Chhat, the Director-General of Plan, it was necessary to rely on 
foreign aid to “achieve rapidly the large-scale works necessary” to industrialize Cambodia. 
However, the Sihanouk government recognized the dangers of forming alliances with exploitive 
Western states; thus, Sihanouk attempted to achieve economic neutrality, which according to the 
Sangkum, meant a “balanced adaptation of [capitalism and communism] for the organization of 
the country.”7 This meant accepting economic aid from both Western and communist states; this 
nonalignment posture, however, created difficulties for Sihanouk as the United States did not 
want Cambodia forming any ties with the East.  
 
Cold War Humanitarianism 
The Decline of Nonalignment 
Despite the Sangkum’s “economic neutrality,” the United States exported over $36 
million worth of goods to Cambodia before 1955 and still hoped its economic assistance 
programs could provide a solid foundation from which Cambodia could modernize. Through a 
section of the United States’ aid program, organized by the International Cooperation 
                                                          
5
 Slocomb, An Economic History of Cambodia in the Twentieth Century, 70-80. 
6
 United States Operations Missions to Cambodia, “U.S. Economic Aid Program to Cambodia, 1955-1969” 
(Washington DC: Indochina Archive, January 1960), 21-23. 
7
Phlek Chhat, La Conquête de l'indépendance du Cambodge (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Printing House of the 
Ministry of Information, October 1964), 1-10. 
5 
 
Administration (ICA) in 1954, the United States funded the completion of le Barray Occidental 
d’Angkor, which provided “irrigation for 20,000 hectares.” The United States agreed to “build a 
dam in Kompong-Cham” that provided irrigation for farming.  In Prey-Chhor, 4,000 hectares of 
irrigation networks were organized and another small irrigation network outside of Kompong-
Cham and Kompong-Thom provinces were constructed with the support of United States aid.
8
 
The United States also helped fund the completion of a 9,000 hectares irrigation channel in 
Kompong-Cham that had been unfinished since 1944; it was finally finished with United States 
support in 1957. In a country comprised of a rural population of over 80 percent, the Sangkum, in 
conjunction with the United States, attempted to modernize the peasantry and gain its support 
through more effective agricultural methods. As Jean Delvert noted, “the politics of water are 
indispensable.”9 However, such agriculture reforms failed to have the lasting impact that the 
United States hoped the reforms would have. 
Through funding such infrastructure projects, the United States hoped to consummate a 
monogamous relationship with Cambodia, but the Soviet Union and Communist China severely 
obfuscated the U.S.-Cambodian relationship. Sihanouk understood the geopolitical implications 
of “playing both sides.” In one instance, in 1957, Sihanouk responded to the United States’ 
unwillingness to allocate more aid with the remark, “‘we might go Communist if you stop the 
aid.’”10 Consequently, the United States remained eager to supply the aid necessary to persuade 
Sihanouk against aligning with the East. Also in 1957, the United States began constructing the 
Khmer-American Friendship Highway from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh at a cost of $32 
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million for the 140 miles of roadway.
11
  Coincidentally, as the Vietnam War escalated, 
communist forces used this highway as an extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to transport 
weapons and munitions to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. In the same year, the French 
began reconstruction on the port of Sihanoukville. However, according to Jean Delvert, the funds 
used to build the port were actually provided by United States and then funneled through a 
French economic aid program.
12
 
The future Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Samphan, acknowledged quite presciently, that 
the “regulation of relations with foreign countries is essential.”13 He argued that industrialization 
was possible, but he believed it could not be achieved by the government continuing to allow 
foreign investors to exploit Cambodia’s economy. In many ways, Samphan was correct in such 
assertions. The Sangkum failed to regulate foreign investment, and Sihanouk’s industrialization 
programs only produced a harsher environment for the peasantry. According to Samphan, trade 
with the United States comprised of 12.35 percent of Cambodia’s total trade value in the late 
1950s. Yet, he claims, this neglects to factor in trade indirectly originating from the United 
States. Cambodia’s trade with Hong Kong, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan all indirectly 
pulled Cambodia into a closer alignment with the United States. Samphan also noted that many 
foreign investments could be traced back to larger United States corporations such as the General 
Insurance Company, New Hampshire Fire Company, and American International Insurance 
Company. 
14
  Such tight economic ties to the United States—whether direct or indirect—
contradicted the Sangkum’s policy of economy neutrality.  
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The United States made aid appropriation decisions based on whether the aid would 
enhance or hinder United States interests in Cambodia. Similarly, the majority of Sihanouk’s 
time in office was spent shuffling between allegiances to various superpowers in an attempt to 
receive aid, protection, or formal recognition from any state willing to grant such requests. In 
return, however, the superpowers spoke of Cambodia as a second-rate state and caused 
considerable damage to its domestic stability. Upon returning from his trip to China in 1958, 
Prince Sihanouk, in an obvious attempt at manipulation, informed United States officials that the 
Chinese Communists had offered him substantial military and economic aid increases, but he 
took only an additional $5.6 million to supplement the existing Chinese aid package of $22.4 
million. Sihanouk claimed that he felt uneasy accepting “such aid from both sides” and that he 
was happy with the aid packages offered by the United States. Sihanouk, in effect, was being 
courted by both the East and the West and he used it to his advantage to acquire the maximum 
amount of aid from all three superpowers.
15
  
This occurred again in 1960 when Sihanouk asked the United States to provide Cambodia 
with eight fighter jets. The United States debated whether to grant the request, but the United 
States determined if they denied the request, Sihanouk might turn to China for the aircrafts. The 
United States then angrily discovered that Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, had already 
promised to provide Cambodia with the aircrafts.
16
  Such economic and military aid infused 
foreign revenue into Cambodia, which made Cambodia dependent on such aid. When these 
foreign aid packages and investments were removed or detrimentally altered, as they often were, 
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it left Cambodia without the national revenue necessary to conduct normal governmental 
functions. 
 
Predation at the International Marketplace 
In the Riel We Distrust 
Even more fiscally caustic than Cambodia’s relationships with foreign investors were the 
foreign investments used to fund infrastructure projects that did not create own-source revenue. 
During the Sangkum period, the Independence Monument, the Cambodiana Hotel, and the 
Olympic National Sports Stadium were constructed and the Bokor Palace was renovated. This 
created two significant problems. Firstly, it induced financial imbalances when these investments 
did not create domestic economic growth. Cambodia was not able to produce revenue from a 
project like the Bokor Palace; thus, when Cambodia could not pay its loans or continue spending 
without foreign investments, the riel lost value and prices went up. Secondly, and more 
importantly, such economic hardships became the burden of the peasantry. The elites associated 
with Sihanouk’s government, according to one official working at the Phnom Penh Post Office, 
had “‘sumptuous villas, luxury cars and lead an enviable life’” despite the economic downturn.17 
Coincidentally, one of those elites, Songksad Kitpanich, made a fortune from the bankruptcy of a 
private Cambodian bank, which created distrust in the Cambodian economy and destabilized the 
riel. He then fled to Bangkok where he organized the finances of the Khmer Serei and helped 
disperse the money to fund Son Ngoc Thanh’s operations.18 Thus, the man who undermined the 
growth of a Cambodian economy funded by the United States eventually joined an anti-Sihanouk 
movement also funded by the United States. 
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In an effort to aid Cambodia, the United States also engaged in currency exchange 
practices that encouraged corruption and Cambodian income inequalities. The United States 
participated in currency triangulation that, in theory, intended to provide the National Bank of 
Cambodia with domestic currency so that Cambodia could fund its own infrastructure projects. 
The United States exported goods to France, which the French would pay for with francs. Those 
francs would then be granted to Cambodia and South Vietnam to import goods from other states 
within the franc zone. By 1957, over 60 percent of French exports to Indochina were paid for 
with these triangulated francs.
19
 However, this caused several fractures in the Cambodian 
economy. Currency triangulation helped turn Cambodia into an economy hinged on imports.  
Cambodia increased its imports from $47.6 million in 1956 to $74.9 million in 1958.
20
 This 
substantial rise in imports can be traced back to the United States economic assistance and 
Washington’s triangulation of currency. Cambodia, a state traditionally reliant on self-
subsistence farming, had become dependent on foreign imports.  
Moreover, the imports were often not used in a financially responsible manner. As Khieu 
Samphan illustrated, by the 1930s, imports for 90 percent of the population consisted of only 4 
percent of the total imports to Indochina. The elites, roughly 10 percent of the Indochinese 
population, directed 49 percent of the imports towards non-essential items. The composition of 
imports, as will be detailed later, did not change by the 1960s; the elite still dominated the 
imports. Thus, by the United States providing aid and triangulated currency, it did little to 
stimulate economic projects that benefitted Cambodia as a whole; rather it served to solidify the 
lavish lifestyles of the elites.
 21
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The second problem associated with currency triangulation to provide francs and riels for 
Cambodian development was that there were loopholes for such currency exchanges. Through 
June 1959, the United States had provided Cambodia with roughly $140 million for Cambodians 
to purchase imports from “all the countries of the free world.”22 However, such aid for import 
purchases did not always have the intended impact. Foreign traders utilized currency exchanges, 
which had to be submitted to the Office National des Changes, to sell or invest a percentage of 
the transaction on a parallel market as exporters could opt to transfer about 13 percent of the 
wholesale value of an export and 75 percent of the profit off an export into a separate exports-
incidental accessories account. Due to discrepancies in international currency valuations, the 
influx of foreign investors trading within the Cambodian markets, and these legal loopholes in 
the Cambodian exchange policies, wealthy traders were able to make a substantial profit. 
Moreover, the exports of certain products, referred to as “échanges compensés,” were tied to the 
imports of other products, which then allowed wealthy traders to make additional profits from 
the international import and exports markets.
23
 By 1963, this parallel market had raised the 
average rate of currency exchanges to 82 riels per $1 dollar, rather than the official rate of 35:1. 
This also created trade incongruities as foreign exporters profited far greater off exports than a 
Cambodian exporter, who did not have access to this parallel market. Despite the United States 
attempting to protect currency exchanges and increase the national supply of riels for domestic 
development, currency triangulation also allowed the domestic and foreign elites to prey on 
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Independence Becomes Interdependence 
Dependency through Trade 
By the end of the 1950s, rubber was the only Cambodian export that the United States 
felt was a viable trade commodity in the West. The Communist Bloc began courting the 
Cambodian government in early 1956, which resulted in trade agreements with Communist 
China, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Poland.
24
 Undoubtedly, such bilateral trade 
agreements with Communist Bloc states worried the United States—despite the fact that such 
trade agreements were in accordance with Cambodia’s notion of economic neutrality. 
Cambodia’s neutrality posture, however, did not quell the concerns of United States officials. In 
a 1952 study prepared by the United States State Department, the United States determined that 
Southeast Asia contained 90 percent of the world’s natural rubber and Communist acquisition of 
rubber resources “would enormously increase their war potential.”25 As a result, the United 
States not only intended to prevent Communist encroachment into Cambodia, but also to solidify 
exclusive trading rights with Cambodia in regards to their strategic resources.  
Thus, in 1950, 48,000 tons of rubber was produced in Vietnam and Cambodia. By 1952, 
it was predicted that these two countries would produce 60,000 tons of rubber.
26
 In 1954, more 
exports were going to the United States than France.
27
 In 1955, rubber comprised of 45 percent 
of Cambodia’s total exports; by the end of the 1950s, rubber had reached roughly 55 percent of 
Cambodia’s total exports, and, in 1960, rubber accounted for nearly 69 percent.28 Creating own-
source revenue was an extremely important facet of Sihanouk’s plan to industrialize Cambodia, 
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and such a growing market for rubber exports could have been a positive sign for the growth of 
Cambodia’s economy. However, the exportation of rubber failed to help Cambodia effectively 
modernize.  
One of the biggest shortcomings of Cambodia’s increased rubber exportation was that not 
only was rubber tapping merely a commodity market without any really modernizing attributes, 
the exports also were usually not own-source revenue. For instance, the formerly French owned 
La Société Khmère des plantations d'Hévéas (SKPH) turned over its plantation to the Cambodian 
government in 1958, which was then supposed to sell shares of SKPH to domestic investors. As 
generous as this may seem, by the late 1960s, the majority of rubber production was still done by 
foreign rubber companies that tapped around 50,000 hectares of rubber. This is compared to the 
roughly 4,500 hectares tapped by Cambodian private investors.  Not only did Sihanouk’s 
economic program allow for foreign investors to remain in control of Cambodia’s resources, but 
self-subsistence farmers did not have the assets to buy public shares of these nationalized 
businesses—only the elite class had any real possibility of acquiring shares to these companies.  
Sihanouk’s government was also unable to organize adequate tax practices. Private 
enterprises made up nearly 85 percent of Cambodia’s revenue, yet they only contributed to 15 
percent of the taxes that were collected.
29
 Thus, although the United States was attempting to aid 
Cambodia in instituting a strong and stable state, Sihanouk’s government was unable to 
implement and enforce policies that could have stabilized its economy.  Due to a poor 
agricultural season in 1955, Cambodia had a budget deficit of $10 million. Instead of Cambodia 
beginning to construct positive reforms, such as equal tax policies, the Sihanouk government 
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simply allowed the deficit to “be offset by US assistance.”30 Such misallocations of United States 
aid did not have a devastating impact on the Cambodian economy in the 1950s, but this weak 
economic foundation became the impetus for Cambodia’s economic paralysis of the 1960s and 
1970s. 
The more aid Prince Sihanouk asked for, the more he received. By 1963, the United 
States was providing the salary for a large portion of the Cambodian army, which consisted of 
30,000 soldiers. The United States, between 1956 and 1963, provided Cambodia with $365 
million in aid. Yet, there was still cause for concern as Cambodia began to gravitate toward the 
two Communist orbits of influence. According to an article by The Economist, “the Americans 
called Prince Sihanouk a maniac. The Prince replied by saying that the face of the United States 
was ‘not noble,’ and that he could not bring himself to hold out his hand to take the American aid 
which, regrettable, was so necessary for his country.”31 Thus, in November 1963, Sihanouk 
publicly denounced the United States’ influence over Cambodia. This allowed China and the 
Soviet Union the opportunity to consolidate an economic partnership with Cambodia. 
Consequently, China armed 27,000 Cambodian soldiers in late 1964, armed an additional 10,000 
soldiers in early 1965, supplied anti-aircraft weapons, helped fund the construction of the 
National Olympic Stadium and an international airport in Siem Riep, and provided eleven 
combat planes to Cambodia.
32
 
During this period, the Soviet Union built a Soviet-Khmer Friendship hospital in Phnom 
Penh, a “superior technical school for 1000 students,” provided 500 million riels in monetary aid, 
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and supplied Cambodia with four jet fighters including a MIG 15 and a MIG 17.
33
 Then, in 1966, 
Chinese officials asked Sihanouk to allow supplies to be shipped into the port of Sihanoukville. 
Prince Sihanouk agreed, but recalled, “‘two thirds for the Viet Cong, one third for yourself. At 
that rate one sells oneself.”’34 Assuredly, not only did the Chinese and Soviets provide Cambodia 
with such large allotments of aid to bring him closer to the Chinese and Soviet orbits, but such 
aid also persuaded him away from the West. 
 
Sihanouk’s Eastern Associates 
“Breaking” with the West 
However, despite Sihanouk’s denouncement of the West in November 1963 and his 
closer ties to the East, the United States still retained an intensive economic partnership with 
Cambodia after 1963. Sihanouk criticism of the United States was more to gain publicity for 
Cambodia’s plight and out of fear of anti-government groups such as the Khmer Serei. As 
Sihanouk described in 1963, Cambodia “will never realize an independent economy” if 
Cambodia continues to associate with a state “organized around corruption, which as a 
consequence, creates dependence for our country.”35 Yet, Sihanouk desired United States’ 
assistance more than a cessation of the assassination plots against him. Although Cambodian 
exports to the United States declined from $9 million in 1963 to $2.2 million in 1965, this cannot 
wholly be attributed to Sihanouk cutting off economic relations with the United States as 
Cambodian exports had steadily declined since 1959. This had more to do with the increased 
Cambodian dependence on imports and external foreign investment, which both did not create 
own-source revenue or a base of exportable goods. The United States was still importing at least 
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$2 million worth of rubber throughout the early 1960s, which the United States even admitted 
was Cambodia’s only viable trade commodity in the West. The Cambodian imports from the 
United States actually increased in the years after breaking economic ties from $8.2 million in 
1963 to $26.3 million in 1965.
36
 Despite Sihanouk’s distaste for the United States’ imperial 
tendencies, such distaste did not significantly hinder trade between these two states. 
The increased imports despite “poor” relations with the United States during this period 
can be partly attributed to elite pressure on Sihanouk to continue trading with the United States. 
This can be seen in the items that were imported during the 1960s as they were not materials 
used by the peasantry. The third highest category, in millions of riels, of imports in 1963 was 
“Distractions, Culture, and Hygiene.” It is doubtful that a peasantry, overcome with debt in this 
period, would have the funds to spend on imports labeled “distractions” or “culture.” Moreover, 
the highest import in 1963 was “Clothing and Apparel.” The peasantry may have contributed to 
the imports for this category, but considering nearly 90 percent of the households in Phnom Penh 
in 1962 that spent money on these clothing imports, spent between 600-1,200 riels a month on 
clothing, it is doubtful that the high importation of clothing was due to the spending of the 
peasantry, who by 1969 still did not make over 2,000 riels per year.
37
 Thus, during the period of 
icy relations between Cambodia and the United States, the influence of the elite class on the 
government’s decision-making process coupled with their taste for Western goods likely 
contributed to the continuation of trade between these two states.
38
 
Yet, despite the continuation of millions of dollars’ worth of trade between Cambodia 
and the United States after 1963, Cambodia did begin to foster closer ties to the two Communist 
orbits. In 1965, Cambodia was exporting over $43 million, mainly rice exports, to China. China 
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also exported nearly $40 million worth of goods to Cambodia that same year.
39
 This correlates to 
U.S.-Cambodian relations because as trade relations and aid allotments increased between 
Cambodian and the two Communist superpowers, communist military activity increased in 
Cambodia as well. This brought the United States, which had yet to conduct any significant 
military operations in Cambodia, closer to conducting such operations. These operations began 
in 1967 and tragically altered the Cambodian landscape and devastated local economies and 
communities. 
 
The United States Indefinitely Intervenes 
Bombs and Border Excursions 
In 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency observed, “South of Attopeu, Route 110 
underwent considerable improvement…Route 97 which provides the road connection between 
Route 110 and Siem Pang, Cambodia was reopened to traffic in early January.”40 Unbeknownst 
to Prince Sihanouk at the time, by supporting Communist actions within Cambodia, he 
effectively helped secure his demise as the United States began to play a more active role in 
finding a Sihanouk replacement who would not allow such concessions to Communist forces. 
Also in 1967, top-secret teams of United States soldiers, in operations code-named Operation 
Salem House, later code-named Daniel Boone Operations, penetrated into Cambodia to seek out 
Communist sanctuaries. Once the missions commenced, it became clear that Communist forces 
were utilizing Cambodian territory to a much greater extent than previously imagined. These 
reconnaissance missions led to the first major bombing run conducted in Cambodia. Operation 
Breakfast, conducted on March 18, 1969 against Base Area 353, would change the course of the 
Vietnam War in Cambodia. Over the course of the bombing campaigns, over 2,500,000 tons of 
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ordnance was dropped over Cambodia; more tons of ordnance was dropped over Cambodia than 
the entire Allied Forces dropped in all of the Second World War. It is conservatively estimated 
that between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodian civilians were killed during the roughly eight years 
of United States bombing activity.
 41
  
The United States bombing campaigns brought obvious animosity as a result of civilian 
deaths, but there were also economic factors due to the bombings that helped fuel anti-U.S. 
sentiment within Cambodia. As one Cambodian recalled, “the bombings caused damages to the 
paddy field—the paddy—the rice fields and the bridges.”42 Moreover, Sao Sarun, a Khmer 
Rouge cadre, reported that in the Mondulkiri providence “there was no market, no exchange of 
goods, not even in the provincial town. And that applies to the rural areas as well. The main 
cause was due to the heavy bombardment. The bombardments sometimes took place four or five 
times per day.”43 Historically a self-sufficient state in terms of rice production, the intense 
bombing campaigns severely inhibited the Cambodian population from producing rice. As the 
number of sorties increased in the early 1970s, there was a distinct decrease in rice production. 
From 1969 to 1970, rice production (in millions) dropped from 3,814 metric tons to 2,732 metric 
tons. By 1973, the year the bombings stopped, rice production was down to 762 metric tons. On 
a similar note, corn production (in millions) in Cambodia dropped from 137 metric tons in 1969 
to 73 metric tons in 1972-1973.
44
 Moreover, it was unsafe to navigate on 40 percent of the roads 
and over ⅓ of the bridges in Cambodia had been blown up. After several years of such heavy 
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bombing, according to one United States Air Force map, “thousands of square miles of densely 
populated, fertile areas” were “black from inundation.”45   
One of the main objectives of Operation Ranch Hand was to establish “a denuded area 
along Viet-Nam borders (with Cambodia, or Laos, or both) to check Viet Cong infiltration.”46 
This led to many instances of defoliant and herbicide use in Cambodian civilian villages and 
agricultural fields. In a study conducted by a team of United States scientists, led by Dr. Charles 
E. Minarik, in 1969, it was determined that 70,000 hectares and about 15,000 hectares of rubber 
and fruit production areas were damaged due to the use of these chemicals. The majority of the 
damage was done within the Dar and Prek Chlong plantations. Some of the damage, done to a 
litany of different plants species, had a “die-back of one to four years of branch growth.”47 Little 
regard was given for how the use of these chemicals could affect the viability of Cambodia. 
Charles Meyer noted, “all of the rubber plantations were methodically ravaged, with no military 
causality, by the spreading of defoliants and the bombardments.”48  
The loss of functioning agricultural and industrial areas was not the only aspect of the 
United States military operations that hindered Cambodia’s solidification of a solid, non-foreign 
driven economy. The elites allowed the military operations to persist without much opposition as 
these elites economically relied on the West to provide them with the benefits of Western 
capitalism. Some Khmer Republic officials made, by some estimates, 25,000 riels per month, 
bought expensive houses, and “owned two or three cars of which often were Mercedes.”49 
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Cambodian officials allowed United States military intervention in part to uphold these 
extravagant living standards.   
The Cambodian government also received compensation for each civilian harmed by the 
United States bombing campaigns. The United States government paid $400 per body, $150 for 
non-fatal casualties, and $100 for lesser injuries; by early 1970, one United States official 
admitted that he had “paid out $24,850 in such relief.”50 From the perspective of the elitist 
Cambodian government, there was little motivation to denounce United States’ intervention. The 
elites were profiting very nicely off the destabilized economy; the peasantry’s plight was a mere 
afterthought. Such military operations actually drew popular support to communism rather than 
repelling it and made Cambodia’s modernization an impossibility. Although the United States 
hinged its anti-communist policy on the modernization theory, its actions were counterintuitive 
in this instance.  
 
Corruption and Cronyism in the Khmer Republic 
The Predatory Elite 
Once Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970, the Lon Nol government quickly aligned itself 
with the United States. Corruption and cronyism ran rampant during this period in part because 
of the loose controls set on United States economic assistance. In 1958, the average rural peasant 
made 1,700 riels per year.
51
 Yet, the average yearly wage of all Cambodians workers—including 
elites and the peasantry—was 3,700 riels in 1963.52 The wide gap between the rich and the poor 
is explicitly illustrated by this statistic as despite over 80 percent of the population being 
comprised of the peasantry, the average yearly income was still much higher than the yearly 
income of the peasantry. By 1969, the average rural peasant still did not make over 2,000 riels 
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per year while the average civil servant made 5,000 riels a month.
53
 Thus, by the early 1970s, the 
peasantry was in desperate need of humanitarian aid.
54
  
However, humanitarian aid was often misappropriated as well. Lon Nol allocated the 
majority of economic aid to support the lavish lifestyles of his government cohorts. The 
opportunistic and predatory elite took advantage of the loose controls on foreign aid. By some 
estimates, roughly half of the $350 million in U.S. aid provided in 1974 went directly for private 
gain. When Lon Nol’s brother, Lon Non, left Cambodia in 1973, he had made over $90 million 
dollars in an inhospitable economic climate.
55
 Corruption was not only widespread, but it came 
at the expense of the peasantry. As the Prime Minister of the Khmer Republic, Long Boret, 
stated in 1973, “‘the elite, which consumes a large part of imported merchandise, have suffered 
rises in the cost of living far less noticeable than the middle and working classes.’”56 Despite 
economic stagnation, the elite somehow still prospered—an unsettling fact for a starving and 
landless peasantry. 
Moreover, the United States’ “Food for Peace” program, PL-480, relied on, under its 
Title I stipulations, concessions and loans that were then used to generate funds to pay for the 
expanding military budget.
57
 The peasantry, unable to rise above the constant indebtedness that 
Cambodia’s dual economy imposed on them, began to form closer ties to the Khmer Rouge. As 
H.E. Tal Nay Im, the current director general of the NBC, reported, inflation was unavoidable 
during this period as the budget deficit was being corrected with currency advances by the NBC. 
In order for the Lon Nol government to pay its civil servants, the NBC was forced to print more 
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currency just to keep the government functioning. Thus, the riel and the economy as a whole 
depended on foreign aid just to stay afloat. Yet, in accepting such massive amounts of foreign 
assistance, the economy became dollarized, which only benefited the elites. The elites had 
exclusive access to the United States currency and, as H.E. Tay Nay Im noted, U.S. dollars, or 
“‘green,’ as it was called, was for the rich and people put it aside for a rainy day.”58  
The rice production in the Khmer Republic dropped from 2,503,000 metric tons in 1968 
to only 762,000 metric tons by the end of 1974.
59
 In 1973 alone, the U.S. arranged 30,000 tons of 
rice to be shipped to Cambodia along with $30 million in economic monetary aid.
60
 As the Thai 
ambassador noted in 1973, “Cambodia used to export [rice]. Now they import.”61 Not only had 
Cambodia become dependent on United States economic assistance, but also due in large part to 
corruption, foodstuff often did not reach the peasantry. Moreover, when it did reach the starving 
peasantry, it was often unbearably expensive due to inflation, lack of supply, or unequal currency 
exchanges. According to the World Health Organization, a kilo of rice cost 300 riels by May of 
1974—much too expensive for the peasantry to afford. In other instances, the peasantry did not 
even have a chance to purchase the rice as the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) sold 
the rice, which at times had been artificially set low to make it affordable, in Thailand or 
Vietnam to make a handsome profit.
62
 There were also reports that the GKR was selling rice to 
the Chinese and selling United States military supplies and medicines to Cambodian and 
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 Such corruption not only undermined the purpose of the aid 
provided by the United States, but also inhibited Cambodia’s ability to stabilize its economy.  
 
Year Zero: The End of Modernity 
As the Lon Nol government continued to implode, the United States tried to fortify 
Cambodia with more aid, but to no avail. There was little possibility of resurrecting the 
Cambodian economy by 1974 due to rural unrest and because the United States was providing 95 
percent of the Khmer Republic’s revenue with only 2 percent representing own-source revenue. 
The Khmer Rouge was too strong; Cambodia’s attempt at modernization had failed to resist 
communism. As the economic situation worsened, all the United States could do was request 
more aid allocations for Cambodia from Congress. For the 1975 fiscal year, Washington asked 
for $750 million dollars in additional aid to be allocated to Cambodia.
64
 Jean-Daniel Gardère, 
quoting Rémy Prud’homme, noted, foreign aid “‘fills the hole that it digs.’” 65 On April 17, 1975, 
the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh. Cambodia’s U.S.-backed twenty-year attempt at 
modernization had failed. The Pol Pot regime quickly undid any hints of modernity by 
transforming Cambodia into a society without currency, without industry, and without markets. 
Or, as the Khmer Rouge referred to it as, Cambodia had been reverted to “Year Zero.” 
Modernity, coupled with mass consumerism, seemed to be a logical antidote to 
communist infiltration, but states often needed external assistance to modernize effectively. 
However, in Cambodia’s case, a vicious cycle presented itself due to its reliance on foreign 
assistance: Cambodia’s weak economy required United States aid, which then increased 
government corruption and dependence on such aid, which then only quickened Cambodia’s 
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economic decay. The Sangkum denounced foreign parasites within the Cambodian economy, but 
such denouncements meant little. In reality, Cambodia fostered close economic ties to the United 
States and never untied them. Sihanouk’s relationship with the East precipitated a United States 
mission to find an alternative to his communist sympathies, but backing the Lon Nol government 
neither repelled communism nor modernized Cambodia’s economy. The Lon Nol government 
did not encourage economic stability—much to the contrary. As a consequence, with the United 
States heavily bombing Cambodia and funding the extravagant lifestyles of the Lon Nol officials, 
the economy spiraled into dissolution. The United States’ attempt to fortify Indochina against 
communistic encroachment conflicted with its primary objective of economic stability; 
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